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PROPOSAL FOR A FAIR STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: E-MAIL STORED IN
A SERVICE PROVIDER COMPUTER
IS SUBJECT TO AN INTERCEPTION
UNDER THE FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT*
Tatsuya Akamine**
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted,
it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general
language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to
the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes.1
INTRODUCTION
Electronic mail ("e-mail") has become an increasingly popular
and important tool of communication in the workplace and at
home.' Accordingly, people have come to expect the same level
" 18 U.S.C. §§ 2232, 2510-2513, 2516-2521, 3117 (1994 & Supp. III
1997). The Federal Wiretap Act is the common name of Title I of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"). See infra note 8 and
accompanying text (explaining the common use of the term "Federal Wiretap
Act" to refer to Title I of the ECPA).
"* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2000. The author wishes to thank Jeannie
Sha for her editorial advice and encouragement.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1909)).
2 "According to a Gallup poll, 90% of all large companies, 64% of midsize
companies and 42% of small businesses use e-mail. Forty million workers
correspond via e-mail, and that number is increasing by 20% per year." Edward
Hertenstein, Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: How Arbitrators Have
Ruled, 52-AUT Disp. RESOL. J. 36, 37 (1997) (citing MARK S. DICHTER &
MICHAEL S. BURKHARDT, ELECTRONIC INTERACTION IN THE WORKPLACE:
MONITORING, RETRIEVING AND STORING EMPLOYEE COMMUNICATIONS IN THE
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of protection for e-mail as a telephone communication.3 In
particular, when a person is given a private password for using an
e-mail account, such an expectation of privacy is quite reasonable.4
INTERNET AGE § I.A (1996), available at <http://www.mlb.com/speechl.-
htm>). "As of January, 1996, thirty-seven percent of U.S. households (35.1
million) had a personal computer; of those, fifty-three percent (18.75 million)
had at least one modem." Michael S. Leib, E-Mail and the Wiretap Laws: Why
Congress Should Add Electronic Communication to Title III's Statutory
Exclusionary Rule and Expressly Reject a "Good Faith" Exception, 34 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 393, 414 (1997).
1 See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (holding that e-mail users generally enjoy a reasonable expectation of
privacy); United Statesv. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,418 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (holding
that e-mail users enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy for the transmitted
message until retrieved by the recipient); Stephen P. Heymann, Legislating
Computer Crime, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 373, 385-86 (1997) (implying a
reasonable expectation of privacy for an e-mail message, as in the case of a
voicemail message). Although e-mail may be more vulnerable to an interception
than a telephone, such a difference does not necessarily justify a different level
of privacy protection. See Leib, supra note 2, at 412-14.
E-mail messages, by their very nature, are already less private
than many other forms of communication. Typically, an e-mail
message, which originates in the computer of the sender, travels
through many computers before reaching its final destination. At each
computer, the operator of the computer system can access the
message. In addition, when the service provider receives the message,
the system computer stores a copy of that message and retains it, even
after retrieval by the intended recipient....
E-mail is an important technology whose vulnerability to
interception makes it that much more important to give it strong legal
protection from interception....
Electronic communication's vulnerability to interception is not a
sound reason for giving it less protection from government intercep-
tion.
Lieb, supra note 2, at 412-13 (footnotes omitted).
' See Leib, supra note 2, at 414 (implying that people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy for e-mail when using a private password); Scott A.
Sundstrom, Note, You've Got Mail! (and the Government Knows It): Applying
the Fourth Amendment to Workplace E-Mail Monitoring, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2064, 2082-86 (1998). However, due to certain exceptions under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
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The most important legislation designed to protect privacy
interests for e-mail is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 ("ECPA"). 5 The ECPA was enacted to amend Title III of
1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), employers enjoy a broad
authority to monitor communications by their employees in the workplace.
Thomas R. Greenberg, Comment, E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy
and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 219, 235 (1994). The first
exception is the "ordinary course of business" exception under section
2510(5)(a)(i) of the ECPA. Id. at 235-36. It is similar to the use of an extension
telephone and permits an employer to monitor employee communication through
the device furnished to and used by an employee in the ordinary course of
business. Id. The second exception is a "system provider" exception under
section 2511(2)(a)(i), whereby an employer, as a system provider, is able to
monitor employee communication as a means to maintain its e-mail system. Id.
at 236-37. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (providing that the prohibition on
unauthorized access to stored wire or electronic communications is not
applicable to the conduct authorized by the entity providing a wire or electronic
communications service). These exceptions in favor of an employer come from
the notion that an employer has the right to preserve its property rights. See
Hertenstein, supra note 2, at 41-42 (discussing case law, NLRB rulings and
arbitration awards which "point toward the concept that employees have some
privacy rights at work, but that those rights are limited by employers' personal
property rights"). However, some commentators address the need to strike an
appropriate balance between an employer's interest in monitoring employee
communication and an employee's privacy concern. See, e.g., Kevin J. Baum,
Comment, E-mail in the Workplace and the Right of Privacy, 42 VILL. L. REV.
1011, 1041 (1997); Greenberg, supra, at 249-50; Sundstrom, supra, at 2068.
It is also recommended that an employer tell its employees of the monitoring
policy. See, e.g., Hertenstein, supra note 2, at 44; Baum, supra, at 1041;
Greenberg, supra, at 249-50.
' Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.). In addition to the ECPA, there are several federal statutes regarding
the protection of privacy interests. One such statute is the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA"), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1994), 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994 & Supp. III 1997),
and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518-2519 (1994)). The FISA, however, is confined to
national security cases, authorizing electronic surveillance to obtain foreign
intelligence information. Id. Another legislation designed to address the recent
technological developments in the context of an electronic communication is the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA"), Pub. L.
No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994)
and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.). The CALEA requires
telephone companies' cooperation with law enforcement and also extends the
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the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19686 (the
original Federal Wiretap Act) in order to cover e-mail and other
forms of electronic communications.7 Title I of the ECPA
("Federal Wiretap Act" )8 addresses the issue of an interception of
electronic communications (i.e., wiretapping), and Title II of the
ECPA ("Stored Communications Act")9 deals with unauthorized
protections under the ECPA to a cordless telephone. In addition, other federal
statutes, not specifically directed at electronic surveillance, but potentially
relevant under certain circumstances, include: Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (regulating government's handling of individual
information); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994 &
Supp. III 1997) (regulating credit reporting agencies to protect the confidentiality
of credit reports); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-
2711 (1994) (prohibiting video stores from disclosing customers' rental records);
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 46 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.,
50 U.S.C.) (prohibiting cable operators from disclosing customers' viewing
records). See also Joshua B. Sessler, Note, Computer Cookie Control:
Transaction Generated Information and Privacy Regulation on the Internet, 5
J.L. & POL'Y 627 (1997) (describing these statutes in detail).
6 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2513, 2515-2520 (1982); 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982).
7 See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (delineating the ECPA).
8 18 U.S.C. §§ 2232, 2510-2513, 2516-2521, 3117 (1994 & Supp. III
1997). Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 has
been commonly referred to as the "Federal Wiretap Act" or "Title III." See
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460 (5th
Cir. 1994); James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age:
Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 65, 71 (1997). Since Title I of the ECPA is an amendment to the Federal
Wiretap Act, in this Note, Title I of the ECPA is often interchangeably referred
to as the "Federal Wiretap Act" for ease of reference, Title III being distin-
guished as the "original Federal Wiretap Act." Title I of the ECPA is captioned
as "Interception of Communications and Related Matters," and its main
provisions are included in the chapter referred to as "Wire and Electronic
Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications." Title
I of the ECPA expanded the pre-existing Federal Wiretap Act in order to
"update and clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of
dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies." S.
REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555. In
contrast, Title II of the ECPA was added to Title 18 as a new chapter. Id.
9 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Title II of the ECPA
is referred to as "Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional
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access to stored electronic communications.'0 For example,
section 2511 prohibits the interception and the use or disclosure of
wire, oral, or electronic communications," and sections 2701 and
2702 prohibit the unauthorized access to and disclosure of stored
wire and electronic communications.'" Title I requires a court
Records Access," and its main provision, section 2701, is entitled "Unlawful
Access to Stored Communications." Thus, in this Note, Title II of the ECPA is
often interchangeably referred to as the "Stored Communications Act" for ease
of reference. Yet this does not suggest that an e-mail message stored in a service
provider computer is solely covered by Title II. It only means that some stored
communications are particularly covered by Title II. The court opinions and
commentaries often refer to Titles I and II by their numbers only. See, e.g.,
Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 459. However, for ease of reference, this Note
often uses descriptive names for Titles I and II of the ECPA as well as their
numbers.
'o See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (delineating the ECPA).
u Section 2511 provides, in relevant part:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any
person who (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any
wire, oral, or electronic communication; . . . (c) intentionally
discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents
of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having
reason to know that the information was obtained through the
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation
of this subsection; (d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or
having reason to know that the information was obtained through the
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation
of this subsection; . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (4)
or shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).
18 U.S.C. § 2511.
12 Section 2701 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Offense.-Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section
whoever (1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided: or (2)
intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility: and
thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such
system shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 2701. Section 2702 provides, in relevant part:
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order for wiretapping, 3 while Title II only requires a search
warrant for accessing stored communications.' 4 The criminal
sanctions and the civil liabilities for violation of Title I are greater
than those for violation of Title 1I.15 The ECPA addresses
invasion of privacy by private parties as well as by government. ' 6
In 1994, the Fifth Circuit held, in Steve Jackson Games, Inc.
v. United States Secret Service, that Title I of the ECPA (the
Federal Wiretap Act) is not applicable to the unauthorized access
(a) Prohibitions. -Except as provided in subsection (b)-(1) a person
or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public
shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a
communication while in electronic storage by that service; and (2) a
person or entity providing remote computing service to the public shall
not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any
communication which is carried or maintained on that service-(A) on
behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from (or
created by means of computer processing of communications received
by means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber or customer
of such service; and (B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or
computer processing services to such subscriber or customer, if the
provider is not authorized to access the contents of any such communi-
cations for purpose of providing any services other than storage or
computer processing.
18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994).
13 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994).
14 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
" The violation of Title I is, in most cases, punishable by a fine or
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a)
(1994). In contrast, the violation of Title II is punishable by a fine or imprison-
ment for not more than six months, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b). See infra
note 69 and accompanying text (describing the criminal sanctions for violation
of Title II). Under section 2520, compensatory damages as well as punitive
damages are recoverable, together with a reasonable attorney's fee. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2520 (1994). The damages are the greater of (I) the sum of the actual damages
and any profits made by the violator, or (II) statutory damages of greater of
$100 a day or $10,000. Id. Under section 2707, compensatory damages as well
as the punitive damages are recoverable, together with a reasonable attorney's
fee. 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The damages include actual
damages and any profits made by the violator, and will in no case be less than
$1,000. Id.
16 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2701. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text
(describing the criminal and civil liabilities for violation of the ECPA).
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of e-mail stored in a service provider computer, which a subscriber
accesses in order to retrieve and read the e-mail message. 17
Unlike a telephone communication, e-mail is stored in a service
provider computer until the addressee accesses the computer to
retrieve and read the message. 18 The Fifth Circuit, relying upon
United States v. Turk, 9 stated that the interception of an electron-
ic communication prohibited by Title I must occur contemporane-
ously with the transmission of e-mail."0 Thus, the unauthorized
access to e-mail stored in a service provider computer does not
violate Title 1.21 The court also emphasized that the definition of
"electronic communication" does not specifically refer to electron-
ic storage, as contrasted with the definition of "wire communica-
tion," which explicitly includes electronic storage.2' Thus, the
court concluded that an interception of electronic communications
17 36 F.3d 457, 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
18 A service provider computer is not a personal computer of an addressee,
but a computer of an e-mail service provider connected via a telephone line with
the subscriber's personal computer. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 8 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3562. The Senate Report explains electronic mail
as follows:
Electronic mail is a form of communication by which private
correspondence is transmitted over public and private telephone lines.
In its most common form, messages are typed into a computer
terminal, and then transmitted over telephone lines to a recipient
computer operated by an electronic mail company. If the intended
addressee subscribes to the service, the message is stored by the
company's computer 'mail box' until the subscriber calls the company
to retrieve its mail, which is then routed over the telephone system to
the recipient's computer. If the addressee is not a subscriber to the
service, the electronic mail company can put the message onto paper
and then deposit it in the normal postal system.
Electronic mail systems may be available for public use or may
be proprietary, such as systems operated by private companies for
internal correspondence.
Id.
19 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976).
o Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460. See infra Part II.B, discussing the
court's reasoning in Steve Jackson Games.
2 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460.
22 Id. at 461.
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does not cover e-mail stored in a service provider computer,
because the term "electronic communication" does not include
"electronic storage. "23 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit considered
the difference in requirements and procedures between Titles I and
II as critical.24 The court stated that Title I does not apply when
accessing e-mail stored in a service provider computer, because
Title II addresses such access.' After Steve Jackson Games,
several cases, including Wesley College v. Pitts,26 followed the
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit.27
However, the consequence of the Steve Jackson Games
decision is largely criticized by commentators. 28 For example,
Commentator Gregory L. Brown, cited in Wesley College, states
23 Id. at 461-62.
24 Id. at 462. See infra Part II.B, discussing the court's reasoning in Steve
Jackson Games.
' Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462-63.
26 974 F. Supp. 375, 381-91 (D. Del. 1997).
27 See United States v. Moriarty, 962 F. Supp. 217, 220-21 (D. Mass.
1997) (holding that listening to a stored voice mail message was not an
interception because the defendant did not listen to the voice mail while it was
recorded on the answering machine); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp.
1232, 1235-36 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that the access to the messages stored
in the computer paging system was not an interception); United States v. Reyes,
922 F. Supp. 818, 836-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that pressing the pager
button to gain access to its message was not an interception because such access
was not made while the message was being transmitted to the pager); Payne v.
Norwest Corp., 911 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Mont. 1995) (holding that non-
simultaneous recording of a voice mail message with a hand-held tape recorder
was not an interception), aff'd inpart and rev'd in part, 113 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.
1997).
' See, e.g., Gregory L. Brown, Recent Development, Steve Jackson
Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service: Seizure of Stored Electronic Mail
Is Not an "Interception" Under the Federal Wiretap Act, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1381,
1390-91 (1995); Nicole Giallonardo, Casenote, Steve Jackson Games v. United
States Secret Service: The Government's Unauthorized Seizure of Private E-mail
Warrants More Than the Fifth Circuit's Slap on the Wrist, 14 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 179, 183-86 (1995); Robert S. Steere, Note, Keeping
"Private E-Mail" Private: A Proposal to Modify the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. 231, 232-46 (1998); Jarrod J. White,
Commentary, E-Mail@Work. Coin: Employer Monitoring of Employee E-Mail,
48 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1997).
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that denying application of Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act) to a
stored e-mail message allows the government to circumvent Title
I by accessing a stored e-mail message rather than one in transmis-
sion. 29 In other words, since transmitted e-mail messages are
immediately stored in a service provider computer, it is not
necessary for the government to intercept e-mail transmission.3"
Moreover, denying the application of Title I (the Federal Wiretap
Act) to such unretrieved e-mail messages contradicts the Congres-
sional intent that Title I should generally protect an electronic
29 See Brown, supra note 28, at 1390. Brown describes the undesirable
result of the Steve Jackson Games court's construction as follows:
[T]he privacy interests of an individual sending E-mail change
constantly during the course of transmission, depending on whether the
message is in a wire, in computer memory, or in a disk when
captured. This arbitrary alteration of privacy interests and penalties
renders the procedural requirements of [the ECPA] meaningless
because an entity could wait until an electronic communication is in
electronic storage before gaining access, thereby bypassing the more
stringent requirements necessary for intercepting the electronic
communication.
Brown, supra note 28, at 1390 (citations omitted). See also Steere, supra note
28, at 263-64. In addition, Brown warns that the ECPA, as.interpreted by Steve
Jackson Games, is likely to raise a constitutional issue under the Fourth
Amendment, and that the Katz test, for determining a reasonable expecation of
privacy, will be used by the courts. See Brown, supra note 28, at 1391; infra
Part I.A, discussing the Katz v. United States decision. See also infra note 65
and accompanying text (discussing the potential constitutional problem).
o See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing the e-mail
communication process). It is not difficult for the government to access the
stored e-mail because Title II provides less stringent requirements for the
government access. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (describing the
different requirements and procedures between Titles I and II of the ECPA).
Jarrod J. White also criticizes the court's reading as follows:
Following the Fifth Circuit's rationale, there is only a narrow window
during which an E-mail interception may occur-the seconds or mili-
seconds before which a newly composed message is saved to any
temporary location following a send command. Therefore, ...
interception of E-mail within the prohibition of the ECPA is virtually
impossible.
White, supra note 28, at 1083.
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communication in the same manner as a telephone communica-
tion,3 and also does not conform to the overall structure of the
ECPA.32 Several courts, consistent with these contentions, held
that unretrieved e-mail messages enjoy a reasonable expectation of
privacy.3 This emerging judicial recognition threatens the Steve
Jackson Games court's assumption that the interception of
unretrieved e-mail messages-not complying with the stringent
procedures under Title I that were established as the necessary
safeguards for the protection of a reasonable expectation of
privacy-does not violate the Fourth Amendment.34 Furthermore,
recently the Ninth Circuit held, in United States v. Smith, that
"intercept" under Title I does not have to be contemporaneous
with the transmission,35 thereby rejecting the Fifth Circuit's
narrow reading of "intercept" in Steve Jackson Games.
In Part I of this Note, the pre-ECPA history and the contents
of the ECPA are briefly described, including the differences
between Titles I and II. Part II first examines the Fifth Circuit's
narrow interpretation of "intercept" in United States v. Turk,36
the Ninth Circuit's recent rejection of such interpretation in
Smith,37 and reviews the courts' analysis in Steve Jackson Games
and Wesley College. Part III proposes an alternative statutory
interpretation of Titles I and II in support of the position that Title
3" See infra notes 57, 64-65 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress
generally intended to protect an electronic communication in the same way as
wire or oral communications and that there is nothing in the legislative history
to indicate the exclusion of unretrieved e-mail messages from the coverage of
Title I).
32 See discussion infra Part III, arguing that "electronic communication"
impliedly includes "electronic storage" and such storage is subject to Title I.
" See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (holding that e-mail users generally enjoy a reasonable expectation of
privacy); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (holding
that e-mail users enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy for the transmitted
message until retrieved by the recipient).
3 See infra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
constitutional problem of the Steve Jackson Games decision).
" 155 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 804
(1999).
36 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976).
37 155 F.3d at 1057-58.
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I (the Federal Wiretap Act) applies to unretrieved e-mail stored in
a service provider computer.3"
I. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT OF 1986
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
("ECPA") was enacted in 1986 to amend Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196839 in an effort "to
protect against the unauthorized interception of electronic commu-
nications."4 ° The ECPA was designed to "update and clarify
Federal privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic
changes in new computer and telecommunications technolo-
gies."'" In particular, the Senate Report noted, "the law must
advance with the technology to ensure the continued vitality of the
[F]ourth [A]mendment. . . . [Privacy] will gradually erode as
technology advances."42 At the same time, the ECPA was
intended to balance privacy interests against the legitimate needs
of law enforcement.4 3
38 The discussion of the statutory language is critical, because the Fifth
Circuit in Steve Jackson Games criticized the defendants for failure to discuss
the relevant provisions of the ECPA:
For the most part, [defendants] fail to even discuss the pertinent
provisions of the [ECPA], much less address their application. Instead,
they point simply to Congress' intent in enacting the ECPA and appeal
to logic (i.e., to seize something before it is received is to intercept
it). But, obviously, the language of the [ECPA] controls.
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460-61
(5th Cir. 1994).
39 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2513, 2515-2520 (1982); 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982).
40 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3555.
41 Id.
42 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3559.
43 id.
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A. The Pre-ECPA Era: Katz v. United States and Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
(The Original Federal Wiretap Act)
Before the 1967 decision in Katz v. United States," the
Supreme Court held that a violation of the right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment45
must accompany a physical trespass by government.46 Thus, a
telephone wiretapping without a physical trespass was not covered
by the Fourth Amendment.4 In Katz, however, the Supreme
Court held that a telephone wiretapping violates the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures-even if such conduct does not involve a physical
trespass.4" The Court noted, "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places."49 However, the Supreme Court indicated that
surveillance approved in advance, by a specific court order
establishing precise limits, may be acceptable under the Fourth
Amendment.5" In response to the Katz decision, Congress enacted
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (the original Federal Wiretap Act).51 Title III required the
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4 The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
46 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928) (reasoning that
the language of the Fourth Amendment only refers to tangible things, such as
persons, houses, papers, and effects, not hearing or sight).
47 Id.
48 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. In Katz, FBI agents wiretapped a public telephone
booth without physically trespassing the suspect's property. Id. at 348-49.
49 Id. at 351.
50 Id. at 356-57.
"' Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25. Congress also
took into consideration the Supreme Court's decision of Berger v. New York,
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government to obtain a court order to tap a telephone and provided
for application of the statutory exclusionary rule for unlawfully
obtained evidence.52
388 U.S. 41 (1967), which struck down the New York electronic eavesdropping
(bugging) statute as violative of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 64. The Berger
court delineated the constitutional standards that such a statute should contain.
Id. at 58-60. Title III was designed to conform to these constitutional criteria as
well as to the Katz decision. The Senate Report states:
To assure the privacy of oral and wire communications, title III
prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other
than duly authorized law enforcement officers engaged in investiga-
tions or prevention of specific types of serious crimes, and only after
authorization of a court order obtained after a showing and finding of
probable cause.
S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2153. "Electronic eavesdropping," sometimes called "bugging," is eavesdrop-
ping by an electronic device. Berger, 388 U.S. at 45-49. Electronic eavesdrop-
ping is a broader term than "wiretapping," which concerns only telegraph and
telephone communications. Id. Neither Title III nor the ECPA uses the terms
"electronic eavesdropping" or "wiretap" in their provisions, though Title III is
entitled "Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance." Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-804,
92 Stat. 197. These statutes instead use the term "intercept." See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(4) (1994) (defining "intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of the
contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device"). Therefore, these statutes in effect
cover "electronic eavesdropping," although the statutes are generally referred
to as the wiretap acts. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining the
common references to these statutes).
52 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994). James X. Dempsey, Senior Staff Counsel,
Center for Democracy and Technology, Washington, D.C., and a former
assistant counsel for former Rep. Don Edwards (former chairman of the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary
Committee), succinctly describes the safeguards established under Title III as
follows:
[C]ontent of wire communications could be seized by the government
in criminal cases pursuant to a court order issued upon a finding of
probable cause; wiretapping would be otherwise outlawed; wiretapping
would be permitted only for specified crimes; it would be authorized
only as a last resort, when other investigative techniques would not
work; surveillance would be carried out in such a way as to "mini-
mize" the interception of innocent conversations; notice would be
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B. Extension of Protection to Electronic Communication by
the ECPA
Prior to the enactment of the ECPA, only wire and oral
communications were protected under the original Federal Wiretap
Act.5 3 By the mid-1980s, absence of the protection of privacy
interests in electronic communications created serious problems,
such as electronic espionage and computer hackers.A4 To remedy
provided after the investigation had been concluded; and there would
be an opportunity prior to introduction of the evidence at any trial for
an adversarial challenge to both the adequacy of the probable cause
and the conduct of the wiretap. "Minimization" was deemed essential
to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement,
compensating for the fact that law enforcement was receiving all of the
target's communications, including those that were not evidence of a
crime. The showing of a special need, in the form of a lack of other
reasonable means to obtain the information, was viewed as justification
for the failure to provide advance or contemporaneous notice of the
search.
Dempsey, supra note 8, at 71-72 (footnotes omitted).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1982). The Senate Report discusses the
situation before the enactment of the ECPA as follows:
In 1984, Senator Leahy asked the Attorney General whether he
believed interceptions of electronic mail and computer-to-computer
communications were covered by the Federal wiretap law. The
Criminal Division of the Justice Department responded that Federal
law protects electronic communications against unauthorized acquisi-
tion only where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. Underscor-
ing the need for [the ECPA], the Department concluded: 'In this
rapidly developing area of communications which range from cellular
non-wire telephone connections to microwave-fed computer terminals,
distinctions such as [whether there does or does not exist a reasonable
expectation of privacy] are not always clear or obvious.'
Senator Leahy's letter and the Justice Department's response
mark the beginning of this legislation.
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3-4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3557-58 (second alteration in original).
5 See Leib, supra note 2, at 403-04.
The consequences of this legal omission [of electronic commu-
nication from the original Federal Wiretap Act] were great. In the
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this situation, the ECPA extended the protection of privacy
interests under the original Federal Wiretap Act to electronic
communications, such as e-mail." In addition, the ECPA added
business context, a rival corporation could intercept electronic
communications, such as e-mail, without repercussion. In fact, by the
mid 1980s, companies were losing millions of dollars a year to
"electronic espionage." In addition, because e-mail is stored and,
therefore, more easily invaded than a telephone call, providers of the
new communications became concerned that customers would be
discouraged from using the new technology for fear of interception.
Law enforcement agencies worried about potential exposure to
liability.
Leib, supra note 2, at 403-04 (footnotes omitted). Although Leib does not define
"electronic espionage," it seems to be a synonym of "electronic eavesdropping."
See supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing "electronic eavesdrop-
ping"). "A 'hacker' is an individual who accesses another's computer system
without authority." Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv.,
816 F. Supp. 432, 435 n.2 (W.D. Tex. 1993), aff'd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir.
1994).
" Leib, supra note 2, at 404. The Senate Report recognizes the importance
of keeping up with the technological development of electronic communications,
but does not indicate in any way the need to treat electronic communications
differently from wire or oral communications. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1-3,
5-8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555-57, 3559-62. More-
over, the legislative history of the ECPA supports the position that e-mail stored
in a service provider computer is subject to an interception under Title I of the
ECPA (the Federal Wiretap Act). That the legislative history does not speak
specifically of the present issue is not dispositive. The Congressional intent, as
revealed by the Senate Report, is that the term "electronic communication"
added to the subject of Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act) be broadly interpreted
in order to be able to accommodate new and evolving technology. See S. REP.
No. 99-541, at 3-5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557-59
(stating "[m] ost importantly, the law must advance with the technology to ensure
the continued validity of the [F]ourth [A]mendment"). The ECPA was enacted
based on the pressing concern that the original Federal Wiretap Act had become
hopelessly obsolete, covering only wire and oral communications. Id. The
Senate Report evidences that the statute cannot keep up with the ongoing
development of technology. Id. Thus, the Congressional intent is that Title I of
the ECPA, enacted to remedy such situations comprehensively, be liberally
interpreted. At a minimum, absent a discernable intent to exclude an e-mail
message temporarily stored in a service provider computer from the coverage
of Title I, the interception of the unretrieved e-mail message should be subject
to Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act). In this connection, it should be noted that
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Title II (the Stored Communications Act) to protect stored wire
and electronic communications.56
Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 472-73 (1928), also cautioned, in the context of technological
development and privacy protection, that we should not lose sight as one
construes a statute. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (referring to Justice
Brandeis' dissenting opinion).
6 Congress added Title II of the ECPA in order to keep up with "the
advent of computerized recordkeeping systems," such as computer database and
remote data processing services offered by computer service companies for
hospitals and businesses. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557. The rationale was that such off-site computer data
in the control of a third party computer service company might be seen as
outside the penumbra of privacy protection and may be freely accessed by
government and private parties. Id. Thus, e-mail messages stored in a service
provider computer as a part of a communication process are not primarily
intended to be covered by Title II. Id. (stating that e-mail messages stored in a
service provider computer for later reference are subject to the Title II
protection, thereby distinguishing such a recordkeeping system from other
communication in transit). Commentator Michael S. Leib describes the
background for the addition of Title II as follows:
The ECPA also granted protection to messages held in electronic
communication storage, which previously were unprotected. An e-mail
message is often retained in the files of the e-mail service provider for
administrative purposes. Without a statutory scheme requiring the
government to obtain a warrant before reading these stored messages,
the government probably would be able to access the stored communi-
cations without court approval. In analogous situations, records kept
by a third party, such as copies of personal checks held by a bank,
have been deemed the property of the third party and, therefore, not
protected by the Fourth Amendment. The rationale is that a person
who communicates information to a third party takes the risk that the
information will be given to government authorities.
Leib, supra note 2, at 404-05 (footnotes omitted). The Senate Report explains
the remote computer services as follows:
In the age of rapid computerization, a basic choice has faced the
users of computer technology. That is, whether to process data in-
house on the user's own computer or on someone else's equipment.
Over the years, remote computer service companies have developed
to provide sophisticated and convenient computer services to subscrib-
ers and customers from remote facilities. Today businesses of all
sizes-hospitals, banks and many others-use remote computing
E-MAIL INTERCEPTION 535
Although Congress extended similar protection to an electronic
communication as for wire and oral communications, there are
several notable differences.57 For example, there are no limita-
tions on the kind of federal felonies for which the government can
access an electronic communication,58 as contrasted to the case of
wire and oral communications.59 Furthermore, the statutory
services for computer processing. This processing can be done with
the customer or subscriber using the facilities of the remote computer
service ... or it can be accomplished by the service provider on the
basis of information supplied by the subscriber or customer. Data is
most often transmitted between these services and their customers by
means of electronic communications.
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 10-11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3564-65.
" See Leib, supra note 2, at 406. "The wide latitude given the government
to intercept electronic communication stands in stark contrast to the controls
Congress placed on investigations involving wire and oral communication. .. "
Leib, supra note 2, at 406. Although these differences indicate that Congress
intended somewhat less statutory protection for e-mail than for wire or oral
communication, this does not prove that Congress did not recognize a reasonable
expectation of privacy for e-mail. To the contrary, the legislative history shows
that Congress generally intended to treat an electronic communication in the
same manner as wire and oral communications. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1-3, 5-8
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555-57, 3559-62. The above
noted differences only go to the extent of statutory protection, such as the kind
of crimes for which the government can apply to a court for an order
authorizing wiretapping. Accordingly, the addition of e-mail to the subject of the
Federal Wiretap Act shows the Congressional intent that an electronic
communication enjoys the same reasonable expectation of privacy as wire or oral
communications. The interpretation of the Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games
contradicts this Congressional intent because it assumes that unretrieved e-mail
messages stored in a service provider computer lack a reasonable expectation of
privacy to be protected by Title I of the ECPA (the Federal Wiretap Act). See
infra note 65 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress recognized a
reasonable expectation of privacy for e-mail).
58 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3) (1994) (providing that a government attorney, such
as a U.S. Attorney or an Assistant U.S. Attorney, may apply to a federal court
for an order authorizing the interception of an electronic communication that
"may provide or has provided evidence of any Federal felony").
59 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (listing the specific crimes
for which the government may apply to a court for an order authorizing the
interception of wire or oral communications, such as murder, kidnapping,
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exclusionary rule does not apply to wiretapping of an electronic
communication.' In other words, the less stringent exclusionary
rule developed by the courts only applies to an electronic commu-
nication.6' Commentators criticize these differences as baseless
and harmful.62 To the extent that e-mail enjoys a reasonable
expectation of privacy as much as a telephone communication
does,63 wiretapping e-mail should meet the same rigorous require-
ments as those for a telephone communication. 4 Otherwise, in
robbery, extortion, bribery, counterfeiting, and drug offenses). Only the
specified officials, such as the Attorney General and other attorneys designated
by the Attorney General, may authorize such an application for wiretapping wire
or oral communications. Id.
60 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (1994).
61 See Leib, supra note 2, at 408.
62 See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 3, at 386; Leib, supra note 2, at 408-11,
415-16; Greenberg, supra note 4, at 247-49. In delineating adverse consequen-
ces to these less stringent protections for an electronic communication, Congress
has been criticized for "creat[ing] a number of potentially harmful consequen-
ces" and "creat[ing] formalistic distinctions between modes of communication
that make the availability of the statutory suppression remedy hinge on arbitrary
factors." Leib, supra note 2, at 411; see Steere, supra note 28, at 265-66.
"[T]he line drawing creates formalistic distinctions that lack a sound policy
basis." Leib, supra note 2, at 409. Additionally, Leib asserts that such
differences are only the result of the compromise, with the Justice Department
voicing its law enforcement concern. Leib, supra note 2, at 409-11. The Senate
Report itself refers to discussions with the Justice Department as a reason for
the inapplicability of the statutory exclusionary rule for an electronic communi-
cation. See S. REP. No. 99-54 1, at 23 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3577.
63 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (arguing that a user has a
reasonable expectation of privacy for e-mail).
4 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the
original Federal Wiretap Act) was Congress's response to Katz, which led to the
development of the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine. See Megan
Connor Bertron, Home Is Where Your Modem Is: An Appropriate Application of
Search and Seizure Law to Electronic Mail, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 163, 166-67
(1996). Thus, even if the government access to a stored e-mail message without
a court order is lawful under Title I of the ECPA, there remains a constitutional
issue, which is beyond the scope of this Note. See Raphael Winick, Searches
and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 89
(1994). See also infra note 65 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress,
by enacting Title I of the ECPA, intended to protect a reasonable expectation of
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light of the Supreme Court decision in Katz, wiretapping an
unretrieved e-mail message raises a constitutional issue under the
Fourth Amendment."
privacy for e-mail in the same manner as for wire communication). See also
Steere, supra note 28, at 232 (arguing that all forms of communications should
be afforded the same level of protection).
I See Steere, supra note 28, at 232-46 (implying that the Steve Jackson
Games decision might raise this constitutional issue); Sundstrom, supra note 4,
at 2078-2102 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment puts a limitation on
government workplace e-mail monitoring because there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy). The constitutional protection of privacy requires a
subjective expectation of privacy and a reasonable expectation of privacy. Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967)). The doctrine of a reasonable expectation of privacy is subject
to certain limitations developed by case law. See Steere, supra note 28, at 242-
46 (describing such limitations including: the lack of "the power to exclude
others by exercising dominion and control;" the open field doctrine; the
assumption of the risk of exposure to a third party). In addition to the
constitutional claim, private parties may assert a tort cause of action for invasion
of privacy. See Baum, supra note 4, at 1020. Raphael Winick describes the
relationship between the constitutional requirement and the statutory requirement
as follows:
Since the protection offered by these statutes exceeds that afforded by
the Fourth Amendment, a government action may be constitutionally
acceptable, but still prohibited by these statutory requirements.
Conversely, an action not expressly prohibited by statute may still be
prohibited if it violates the [C]onstitution. Unlike the protection of the
Fourth Amendment, these statutory prohibitions also apply to individu-
als not acting on behalf of the government.
Winick, supra note 64, at 89. The original Federal Wiretap Act is clearly based
on the doctrine of a reasonable expectation of privacy, as is shown by its
legislative history indicating that the Act was enacted in response to the Katz
decision. See Bertron, supra note 64, at 166-67. For example, the definition of
"oral communication" manifests the relevance of such a doctrine. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(2) (1994) (defining "oral communication" as "any oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation")
(emphasis added). Wire and electronic communications are defined without
reference to any privacy expectation, but are protected nevertheless. See 18
U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994) (defining "wire communication" as "any aural transfer
made . . . through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications
by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin
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The ECPA includes Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act) and Title
and the point of reception ... for the transmission of interstate or foreign
communications"); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (defining
"electronic communication" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects
interstate or foreign commerce"). See also Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront
to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace,
8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345, 354 (1995); Steere, supra note 28, at 269 n.246.
The justifications for a greater restriction for wiretapping are that all
communications are subjected to the surveillance; the lack of particularity
required by the Fourth Amendment (general searches); on-going intrusion (the
duration); and the lack of notice to a suspect. See Dempsey, supra note 8, at 70-
72. See also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (describing the original
Federal Wiretap Act). With respect to accessing e-mail stored in a service
provider computer, these elements are met even though such access is not
contemporaneous with its transmission by a sender. See Winick, supra note 64,
at 89. As between wire and electronic communications, the Senate Report does
not make any distinctions about the needs for privacy protection. S. REP. No.
99-541, at 1-5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555-59. The
possible manners of government intrusion are also similar because the above
four elements equally apply to wire and electronic communications. The
underlying expectation of privacy does not change even if the e-mail message
is temporarily stored in a service provider computer. See supra notes 3-4 and
accompanying text (arguing that e-mail, even if temporarily stored before
retrieved, enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy). See also S. REP. No. 99-
541, at 1-5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555-59 (generally
treating wire and electronic communications in the same manner, without
singling out an unretrieved e-mail message stored in a service provider
computer).
Because the term "wire communication" explicitly includes its "electronic
storage," no one disputes that the stored wire communication enjoys privacy
protection. The Senate Report did not make any distinctions between the stored
e-mail and stored wire communication. Id. There is also nothing in the
legislative history that indicates denial of a reasonable expectation of privacy in
unretrieved e-mail stored in a service provider computer. Since there exists a
reasonable expectation of privacy for unretrieved e-mail stored in a service
provider computer, the Steve Jackson Games court's interpretation, in light of
the Katz decision, raises the serious constitutional problem that government
access not complying with the Title I requirements violates the Fourth
Amendment. Such access deserves the greater protection under Title I (the
Federal Wiretap Act). See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing the
protection afforded by the original Federal Wiretap Act).
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II (the Stored Communications Act), with different restrictions and
procedures applicable to each title.66 Title I regulates the intercep-
tion of e-mail as "electronic communication," and Title II applies
to unauthorized access to a stored e-mail message.67 The violation
of Title I is, in most cases, punishable by a fine or imprisonment
for not more than five years, or both.6" The violation of Title II
is punishable by a fine or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both.69 Furthermore, civil remedies are available
under both Titles I and I. 0 However, the government must
obtain a court order to wiretap an electronic communication in
accordance with the strict requirements under Title I (the Federal
I Title III of the ECPA prohibits the use of pen register and trap and trade
devices without a court order. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3126 (1994); S. REP. No. 99-
541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557. The Senate
Report explains pen registers and trap and trace devices as follows:
Pen registers are devices that record the telephone numbers to which
calls have been placed from a particular telephone. These capture no
part of an actual telephone conversation, but merely the electronic
switching signals that connect two telephones. The same holds true for
trap and trace devices, which record the numbers of telephones from
which calls have been placed to a particular telephone.
Id. at 3564. Originally, the ECPA excluded from protection "the radio portion
of a cordless telephone communication transmitted between the cordless handset
and the base unit" because such a communication can be intercepted easily with
an AM radio. Id. at 3566. However, that exclusion was deleted in 1994 by the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414,
108 Stat. 4279 (1994).
67 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2701 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
6' 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) (1994).
'9 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b). In the case where there exists the aggravating
factors, such as the commercial gain purpose and malicious destruction, the
imprisonment term increases up to two years. Id.
'0 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
Under section 2520, compensatory damages as well as punitive damages are
recoverable, together with a reasonable attorney's fee. 18 U.S.C. § 2520. The
damages are the greater of (I) the sum of the actual damages and any profits
made by the violator, or (II) statutory damages of greater of $100 a day or
$10,000. Id. Under section 2707, compensatory damages as well as the punitive
damages are recoverable, together with a reasonable attorney's fee. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2707. The damages include actual damages and any profits made by the
violator, and will in no case be less than $1,000. Id.
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Wiretap Act),71 but may access a stored electronic communication
by a search warrant in accordance with the less stringent proce-
dures under Title II (the Stored Communications Act).72 Accord-
ingly, Title II affords significantly less protection than Title I
against government intrusion.73
II. CASE LAW: TURK, SMiTH, STEVE JACKSON GAMES, AND
WESLEY COLLEGE
The Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games held that access to
unretrieved e-mail stored in a service provider computer was not
an interception under Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act)." 4 In so
holding, the Fifth Circuit employed the narrow reading of the term
"intercept" as used in United States v. Turk.75 However, the Turk
court's interpretation lacked sound basis either in the statutory
"' 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994). The court order must not be "for any period
longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any
event longer than thirty days." Id. Furthermore, the authorized interception must
be conducted "in such a way as to minimize the interception of communica-
tions." Id.
72 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (providing that the govern-
ment may access a stored electronic communication with a search warrant). See
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 n.7
(5th Cir. 1994) (stating that government must obtain a court order under Title
I in order to access a stored wire communication).
7 See Leib, supra note 2, at 405-06. "[S]tored electronic communication
is treated much like regular mail sent via the United States Postal Service."
Leib, supra note 2, at 405.
14 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460-64. In the ECPA, the term
"intercept" is defined as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any
wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994).
7' 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976). In Turk, "intercept" was construed as
"requir[ing] participation by the one charged with an 'interception' in the
contemporaneous acquisition of the communication through the use of the
device." Id. at 658. In Turk, cassettes tapes containing a previously recorded
telephone conversation were seized by police without a warrant. Id. at 656. The
court required that an interception by definition be contemporaneous with the
transmission of a telephone communication. Id. at 657. Thus, the seizure of the
cassette tapes was held not to be an interception. Id. at 658.
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language or the legislative history.76 The Fifth Circuit in Steve
Jackson Games also considered the absence of the term "electronic
storage" in the definition of "electronic communication" as
critical.77 Such absence, the court concluded, implied that an
interception of "electronic storage" of "electronic communication"
was not covered under Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act) .78
Subsequent courts, including the court in Vlesley College v.
Pitts, 79 relied on Steve Jackson Games.80 However, the Ninth
Circuit, in United States v. Smith, recently rejected the Turk
court's narrow interpretation of "intercept.""' Furthermore,
"electronic communication" impliedly covers the entire communi-
cation process-including its "electronic storage." 2 The Steve
Jackson Games court's interpretation is also in contradiction of the
76 See infra Part II.A, discussing the court's reasoning in Turk.
7 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)
(1994 & Supp. III. 1997) (defining "electronic communication" as "any transfer
of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelec-
tronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce").
78 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62.
'9 974 F. Supp. 375, 385-87 (D. Del. 1997) (holding that e-mail stored in
a service provider computer is not subject to an interception under Title I).
o See, e.g., United States v. Moriarty, 962 F. Supp. 217, 220-21 (D.
Mass. 1997) (holding that listening to a stored voice mail message was not an
interception because the defendant did not listen to the voice mail while it was
recorded on the answering machine); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp.
1232, 1235-36 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that the access to the messages stored
in the computer paging system was not an interception); United States v. Reyes,
922 F. Supp. 818, 836-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that pressing the pager
button to gain access to its message was not an interception because such access
was not made while the message was being transmitted to the pager); Payne v.
Norwest Corp., 911 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Mont. 1995) (holding that non-
simultaneous recording of a voice mail message with a hand-held tape recorder
was not an interception), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 113 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.
1997).
81 155 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 804
(1999).
2 See infra Part III.A, arguing that "electronic communication" impliedly
includes "electronic storage."
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Congressional intent that e-mail generally be protected in the same
manner as a telephone communication.83
A. Split Between the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit:
Whether "Interception" Requires Contemporaneity with
Transmission
In United States v. Turk, the officers of the Dade County
Public Safety Department stopped the suspects' car, based on a tip
that they possessed cocaine and firearms.84 After the officers
83 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress
recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy for an electronic communication
and intended to afford an electronic communication the same basic protection as
a telephone communication under Title I of the ECPA (the Federal Wiretap
Act)). One of the fallacies of the Steve Jackson Games court's interpretation is
that it did not inquire into the issue of whether parties to unretrieved e-mail
stored in a service provider computer enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy.
In order to conclude that its interpretation conforms with the purpose of Title I,
the court, at a minimum, should have addressed this issue. The Steve Jackson
Games court's reference to the legislative history of the ECPA mainly goes to
the point that the Turk court's interpretation of "intercept" did not change by the
enactment of the ECPA. 36 F.3d at 462. See also Wesley College, 974 F. Supp.
at 387 (following the Steve Jackson Games court's view of the legislative history
of the ECPA). That Congress did not intend to change the meaning of
"intercept" does not necessarily mean that the Turk court's interpretation in a
telephone communication case should be strictly followed in the different
circumstance of an e-mail communication. See supra note 55 and accompanying
text (arguing that the contemporaneity with transmission requirement should be
liberally applied in an e-mail interception case). In addition, the Steve Jackson
Games court, referring to the legislative history, argued that the substantial
differences in requirements and procedures between Titles I and II show that
Congress intended to apply Title I to an interception of stored e-mail. Steve
Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463 n.8 (noting that section 2511(3) prohibits a
service provider from disclosing the contents of an electronic communication
while in transmission, while section 2702(a) prohibits a service provider from
disclosing the contents of any communication while in electronic storage).
However, such an interpretation is inconsistent with the legislative history and
the overall structure of the ECPA. See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text
(arguing that such interpretation results in the failure to cover the prohibition of
the disclosure of an electronic communication by a person other than a service
provider).
526 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1976).
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discovered cocaine in the car and arrested the suspects, the officers
also removed from the car a tape recorder and two cassette
tapes.15 The officers listened to the tapes at the station house."
As the court noted, "[t]hey soon realized that they were listening
...to a recording of a private telephone conversation. . . .[and
t]he officers continued to listen out of 'curiosity.'"87 The issue
before the court was whether the seizure and replaying of the
cassette tapes was an "interception" under the original Federal
Wiretap Act. 8
The court held that an interception "require[d] participation by
the one charged with an 'interception' in the contemporaneous
acquisition of the communication through the use of the de-
vice." 9 The officers, who seized and listened to the tapes, were
not involved in the recording of the tapes.' The suspect himself
had recorded his previous telephone conversation in the tapes.9"
Thus, the seizure of the cassette tapes was not an interception
prohibited under the original Federal Wiretap Act.92 This inter-
pretation, however, was not derived from a close reading of the
statutory language. Rather, the Turk court looked to the legislative
history of the statute to support its interpretation.93
85 id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 656-57.
' Id. at 657. This case was decided in 1976, before the enactment of the
ECPA. Id. at 654.
89 Id. at 658. "[Ain 'interception' requires, at the least, involvement in the
initial use of the device contemporaneous with the communication to transmit or
preserve the communication." Id. at 658 n.3. At the time of Turk and before the
enactment of the ECPA in 1986, "intercept" was defined in the original Federal
Wiretap Act as "the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
Id. at 657. The ECPA differs from the original Act by its use of "aural" instead
of "aural or other" and its reference to "electronic communication." See supra
note 51 and accompanying text (delineating the language of the current version
of section 2510(4)).
90 Turk, 526 F.2d at 656.
91 Id.
9 Turk was decided before the 1986 enactment of the ECPA. Id. at 654.
93 See id. at 658-59 (citing S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 90 (1968), reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2178).
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Primarily, the court noted in evaluating Title I that "[t]he
words 'acquisition ... through the use of any ... device' suggest
that the central concern is with the activity engaged in at the time
of the oral communication which causes such communication to be
overheard by uninvited listeners."94 Furthermore, the court
pointed to the policies reflected in the legislative history and stated
that the specific focus of the statute was wiretapping and electronic
surveillance.95 In other words, the contemporaneity element of an
interception was merely based on the court's presumption that the
interception meant wiretapping, which is not defined anywhere in
the statute.96 Even if the court presumed that wiretapping a
telephone communication required its contemporaneous acquisition
with transmission, it does not lead to the conclusion that wiretap-
ping e-mail also requires the contemporaneity with transmission
because access to unread e-mail does not require contemporaneity
with its transmission.97 Therefore, the contemporaneity element
did not have sound basis either in the statutory language or the
94 Id. at 658.
9 Id. at 659 ("[A]ct of surveillance and not the literal 'aural acquisition'
(i.e., the hearing), which might be contemporaneous with the surveillance, or
might follow therefrom, was at the center of congressional concern."). Although
the Turk court looked to the reference to a device in the definition of "inter-
cept," the element of the contemporaneity with a communication and the
participation by police in the initial acquisition of the contents of a communica-
tion are primarily derived from the court's understanding of the statutory
purpose that wiretapping is the designed objective of the prohibition. It should
be noted that limiting the term "intercept" to a vague concept of the wiretapping
activity does not necessarily require the acquisition of a communication strictly
contemporaneous with transmission. The court merely attempted to describe
wiretapping in the context of a telephone communication, which is different
from e-mail in that the acquisition of a telephone communication is possible only
while in transmission. Thus, the Steve Jackson Games court should not have
used the same reading for an e-mail communication.
9 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (stating that the word
"wiretapping" is not used in the substantive provisions of the ECPA).
9 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing the e-mail
communication process). See also supra note 30 and accompanying text (arguing
that requiring contemporaneity renders an interception of e-mail under Title I
virtually impossible).
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legislative history.98 In fact, the court conceded that the defen-
dant's interpretation-that an interception included the seizure and
replaying of an audio tape of a prior telephone conversation-was
a conceivable reading.99 Moreover, the court acknowledged that
"[n]o explicit limitation of coverage to contemporaneous 'acquisi-
tions' appears in the [the original Federal Wiretap Act]." 100
Accordingly, the Turk court should not have created its own
narrow interpretation of "intercept." Rather, the court could
simply have reasoned that the telephone communication ended
when police seized and listened to the tape of the telephone conversation. 101
' In essence, the Turk court attempted to limit the meaning of "acquisition"
to obtaining the contents of a communication using a device. See supra notes 94-
95 and accompanying text (describing the Turk court's interpretation of
"intercept"). Acquiring the contents of unretrieved e-mail messages stored in a
service provider computer clearly satisfies this limitation. Thus, the contempo-
raneity with the communication, stated by the Turk court, need not be strictly
understood as the acquisition while in transmission.
99 Turk, 526 F.2d at 657.
100 Id. at 658.
101 In Turk, police were not involved in the initial recording of the telephone
conversation. Id. at 656-57. See id. at 658 (emphasizing that the "central
concern is with the activity"). See also supra note 93 and accompanying text
(arguing that the Turk court's interpretation of "intercept" does not necessarily
require the acquisition while in transmission). Furthermore, because the
contemporaneity requirement for an interception was developed for a telephone
wiretapping in Turk, such a requirement should not have been carried over to
a situation involving e-mail. See Bertron, supra note 64, at 183-84. In a
telephone wiretapping, an interception must be contemporaneous with the
conversation in order to acquire its contents. In contrast, e-mail need not be
wiretapped while it is transmitted, because the message is stored in a service
provider computer. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the e-
mail communication process). Megan Connor Bertron, cited in Wesley College,
compares first class mail, a telephone and e-mail by noting that:
Unlike telephone transmissions, which involves simultaneous discus-
sion, both e-mail and regular mail generally involve some delay
between transmission and reception.. . . [B]oth first class mail and
e-mail wait for the recipient if she is not at home and can be read by
the recipient on her own time. .. . [U]nlike telephone communica-
tions, the content [of an e-mail or first class mail] is not lost as soon
as the user hangs up .... [E]-mail and telephones are much less
comparable.
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Recently, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Smith, rejected
the Fifth Circuit's narrow interpretation of "intercept" and held
that an interception does not have to be contemporaneous with the
transmission. °2 In Smith, the defendant, who was an executive
at a software design firm, left his colleague a voicemail message
indicating that the defendant engaged in insider trading. 1°3
Another employee of the firm ("Gore"), without authorization,
retrieved the message and recorded it with a handheld tape
recorder."° Gore gave the tape to her co-worker, who then
informed government of the contents of the tape."° The defen-
dant was convicted of insider trading. c6 One of the issues before
the court was whether Gore's conduct amounted to an interception
of a wire communication under Title I of the ECPA (the Federal
Wiretap Act). 0 7 The district court answered the question in the
affirmative and suppressed the evidence of the voicemail message,
though the conviction was also based on other evidence."0 8 The
Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Gore's conduct
constituted "interception" under Title I.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Turk court's narrow interpreta-
tion of "intercept" requiring contemporaneity with transmission,
because the definition of "intercept" does not contain the contem-
poraneity limitation, but rather is "broad enough to encompass
Gore's conduct."" 0 The court, rejecting the use of a dictionary
meaning of "intercept," noted that "[w]hen, as here, the meaning
of a word is clearly explained in a statute, courts are not at liberty
to look beyond the statutory definition.""' Moreover, the court
stated that inclusion of the contemporaneity element in the
Bertron, supra note 64, at 183-84 (footnote omitted).
102 155 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 804
(1999).
'03 Id. at 1053.
1' Id. at 1054.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1059.
110 Id. at 1055-58.
' Id. at 1057 (quoting Calautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 393 (1979)).
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definition of "intercept" renders the prohibition of an intercept of
a wire communication in electronic storage under Title I essentially
meaningless, because the stored message cannot be acquired
contemporaneously. 2
B. "Interception" and "Electronic Communication" in Steve
Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service
In Steve Jackson Games, the operator and users of an electron-
ic bulletin board system ("BBS") sued the United States Secret
Service ("Secret Service") for violation of the ECPA." 3 The
plaintiffs alleged that the Secret Service, without authorization,
seized and read the e-mail messages stored in a service provider
computer in connection with a search of the operator's premis-
es." 4 The search was conducted to seize evidence of unautho-
rized access to a telephone company's computer files, and the
unauthorized distribution of such information on the BBS. 115
However, the BBS also provided an e-mail service to the opera-
tor's customers."' The hard disk of the BBS computer tempo-
rarily stored e-mail messages addressed to the customers, who
were to access the BBS computer in order to retrieve their messag-
es.17 The Secret Service seized the computer operating the
112 Id. at 1058.
113 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457,
459 (5th Cir. 1994).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 459. The search warrant authorized:
[T]he seizure of, inter alia, [clomputer hardware ...and computer
software . . . and. . . documents relating to the use of the computer
system . . . , and financial documents and licensing documentation
relative to the computer programs and equipment. . . which constitute
evidence ...of federal crimes. . . . This warrant is for the seizure
of the above described computer and computer data and for the
authorization to read information stored and contained in the above
described computer and computer data.
Id.
116 Id. at 458.
117 Id.
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BBS. "8 This computer contained "162 items of unread, private
E-mail ... stored on the BBS," 119 which were read by the
Secret Service. 120
The district court held that the Secret.Service violated Title II
(the Stored Communications Act) and awarded $1,000 to each
individual plaintiff, but denied the government's liability under
Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act) .12' The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment. 22 The Fifth Circuit, relying on
Turk, reasoned that the acquisition of the contents of an electronic
communication was not contemporaneous with their transmission,
and thus, was not unlawful under Title I (the Federal Wiretap
Act). 123
However, Turk and Steve Jackson Games are distinguishable in
one critical aspect. In Turk, police seized cassette tapes of a
suspect found in his car without a warrant. 2" These tapes con-
tained a private telephone conversation made by the defendant that
he recorded previously."2 Thus, the telephone communication
had ended and had been recorded in the cassette tapes when police
seized and listened to them. 26 On the other hand, in Steve
Jackson Games, the e-mail messages were not received by their
intended addressees.'27 The Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson
Games, however, failed to discuss such a difference."2
18 Id. at 459.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 459-60. The district court reasoned that "the Secret Service did not
intercept the communications, because its acquisition of the contents of those
communications was not contemporaneous with their transmission." Id. at 460.
122 Id. at 464.
'23 See id. at 460.
124 United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1976).
'2' Id. at 656-57.
126 id.
127 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d 't 459.
128 Id. at 460-61. The court's real difficulty may be in drawing a line
between a more serious invasion to "electronic storage" of "electronic communi-
cation" (for example, wiretapping e-mail stored in a service provider computer)
and a less serious one (for example, seizure of a floppy disk containing prior e-
mail messages recorded by its owner-receiver), because both cases do not
involve participation by police in an initial storage of e-mail transmission. In
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The term "intercept" is defined in the ECPA as "the aural or
other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device."129 This definition may be divided into three parts:
(1) an acquisition of the contents; (2) of a wire, electronic, or oral
communication; and (3) through the use of a device. Of these three
parts, (1) and (2) are relevant to the issue of whether access to e-
mail stored in a service provider computer is an interception under
Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act). As stated in United States v.
Smith, 130 an "acquisition of the contents" is the term broad
enough to encompass the access to a stored e-mail message,13
and thus, an "intercept" need not be simultaneous with the
transmission. 132
Thomas R. Greenberg, cited in Wesley College, nevertheless
argues that an "intercept" means "'interrupt the progress or course
of,"' citing a dictionary meaning. 133 Thus, "the acquisition of a
fact, the Fifth Circuit in Wesley College used the seizure of a computer disk
containing "electronic communication" as an example of a troublesome case to
apply the stringent requirements under Title I of the ECPA (the Federal Wiretap
Act). Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (D. Del. 1997). However,
such difficulty is overstated, because in both cases there exists the risk of
general searches, which is the very concern under the Federal Wiretap Act. At
a minimum, the court could have differentiated the recorded cassette tapes in
Turk from the unread (unretrieved) e-mail messages stored in a service provider
computer. The latter case may easily be analogized to a telephone message in
the process of communication (for example, a message recorded in an answering
machine). One possible factor to differentiate the requirements under the ECPA
is that the unread (unretrieved) e-mail message stored in a service provider
computer is part of a communication process, though necessarily is not in
"electronic storage."
129 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994).
3 155 F.3d 1051, 1055-59 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 199 S. Ct. 804
(1999).
131 See infra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing the term
"intercept").
132 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (arguing that the Turk court
does not require strict contemporaneity with transmission for an interception).
113 See Greenberg, supra note 4, at 248 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1176 (1986)). Greenberg's interpretation was cited
in Wesley College as an example of the endorsement of the court's interpretation
by commentators. See 974 F. Supp. at 388 n. 12.
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wire, oral, or electronic communication will constitute an
'interception,' only while being transmitted."134  However,
another commentator interprets the word "intercept" different-
ly, 135 asserting that an intercept means "'(1) to prevent and
hinder; (2) to stop, seize, or interrupt in progress or course or
before arrived; or (3) to interrupt communication, or connection
with."" 136 Alternatively, she argues, that "'interception' is the
'taking or seizure by the way or before arrival at destined
place."' 137 Thus, she concludes that the Secret Service intercept-
ed the e-mail, because they seized it "before the intended recipi-
ents took control." 138 Accordingly, the search for the common
meaning of "intercept" by resorting to a dictionary definition is not
conclusive. 139 To say the least, the language of the definition
does not compel the interpretation adopted by the Steve Jackson
Games court.
With respect to the second part of the definition of "intercept"
under the ECPA, the Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games
considered the differences between "wire communication" and
"electronic communication" as critical. 4 ° While the definition of
"wire communication""' includes "electronic storage," the
13 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 248.
135 See Giallonardo, supra note 28, at 185, 203-04.
136 Giallonardo, supra note 28, at 185 (citing WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 630 (1988)).
13' Giallonardo, supra note 28, at 185 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
811 (6th ed. 1990)).
138 Giallonardo, supra note 28, at 185.
139 See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
240 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Dictionaries can be useful aids in statutory
interpretation, but they are no substitute for close analysis of what words mean
as used in a particular statutory context.").
"4 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457,
461 (5th Cir. 1994).
141 The ECPA defines "wire communication" as:
[Any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire,
cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the
point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching
station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or
operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign
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definition of "electronic communication" does not include "elec-
tronic storage. ' 142 In essence, the Steve Jackson Games court
stated that the absence of any reference to "electronic storage" in
the definition of "electronic communication" suggested that the
interception does not apply to a stored "electronic communica-
tion. '14'  Thus, the court held that Title I (the Federal Wiretap
Act) does not apply to a stored "electronic communication," such
as e-mail stored in a service provider computer.1" However,
mere absence of the reference to "electronic storage" does not
necessarily mean that it is excluded from the meaning of "electron-
ic communication. 1 45 In other words, if the meaning of
communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign
commerce and such term includes any electronic storage of such
communication.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994).
"42 In contrast, the ECPA defines "electronic communication" as:
[A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that
affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include-(A) any
wire or oral communication; . . . (D) electronic funds transfer
information stored by a financial institution in a communications
system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). "Electronic storage" is defined
as:
(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communi-
cation service for purposes of backup protection of such communi-
cation.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (1994).
143 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460-62. The court also reasoned that
the use of the word "transfer" in "electronic communication" supports its
interpretation. Id. However, "transfer" is used in the ECPA as covering the
entire process of communication from the message's origin to its receipt by an
addressee. See infra note 208 and accompanying text (arguing that "transfer" as
used in the ECPA is broader in meaning to cover the entire communication
process, including its incidental storage).
144 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460-62.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
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"electronic communication" is broad enough to encompass
"electronic storage," it is not necessary to add the reference to
"electronic storage." Similarly, even if the definition of "wire
communication" contains a specific reference to "electronic
storage," it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
absence of the same reference in the definition of "electronic
communication" implies the exclusion of "electronic storage" from
that definition. The reference in the definition of "wire communi-
cation" is instead designed to clarify that "wire communication"
includes storage of an electronic nature.146
Moreover, the court's argument presupposes that an intercep-
tion occurs only while in transmission. As stated in United States
v. Smith, contemporaneity is not required for an interception. 147
In fact, the reasoning of the court in Steve Jackson Games does not
require that the definition of "electronic communication" exclude
"electronic storage," because an intercepting activity itself, as the
court interpreted, excludes access to "electronic storage. 14
Accordingly, the absence of any reference to "electronic storage"
in the definition of "electronic communication" does not compel
the court's interpretation that access to e-mail stored in a service
provider computer is not subject to the Title I (Federal Wiretap
Act). Since the definition of "electronic communication" is
applicable to Titles I and 11,149 it is more consistent with the
structure of the ECPA to read that "electronic communication"
includes its storage. 150 The court's assumption that "electronic
communication" excludes "electronic storage," unless the
'4 See discussion infra Part III.B.
147 155 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 804
(1999).
"4 See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460.
149 Section 2711 of Title II incorporates the definitions in section 2510, and
thus, the definitions in section 2510 are used both for Titles I and II. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2711 (1994). There is no separate definition of "electronic communication"
for Title II only.
50 See discussion infra Part Ill.A, arguing that "electronic communication"
impliedly covers "electronic storage".
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definition expressly includes the storage, contradicts the structure
of the ECPA.151
The Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games cited the differences
of requirements and procedures between Titles I and II as an
additional reason to deny the application of Title I (the Federal
Wiretap Act) to "electronic storage" of "electronic communica-
tion. 152 First of all, the court concluded that Title II (the Stored
Communications Act) clearly applies to the Secret Service's
conduct in the case.153 The court proceeded to state that the
conduct prohibited under Title II is "most unlikely" to be covered
by Title I, because there are substantial differences between both
titles. "'54 However, the court's reasoning cannot explain why
Title I should not be applicable to an interception of a stored
"electronic communication."1 55
151 See discussion infra Part III.A, arguing that "electronic communication"
impliedly covers "electronic storage." The task of statutory interpretation begins
with examination of the language of the statute. See Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490
U.S. 714, 722 (1989). However, the language of the statute should be
understood in context, examining the statutory language as a whole and taking
into consideration the overall statutory structure. See United States Nat'l Bank
of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993)
(quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122
(1849)); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tollentire, 477 U.S. 207, 220-21 (1986).
The flaw in the Steve Jackson Games court's analysis is that it examined only
"intercept," "electronic communication" and "wire communication," without
taking into consideration other related terms, such as "electronic storage" and
"electronic communication system." Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62.
See infra discussion in Part III.A, arguing that "electronic communication"
impliedly includes "electronic storage" in view of the context and structure of
the statute as a whole.
152 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 464.
153 Id.
'" Id. Those differences cited by the court include: (1) a court order
requirement under Title I and a warrant requirement under Title II; and (2) the
minimization, duration and types of crimes requirements in the court order
under Title I. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518(5) (1994).
155 Moreover, Title II was not intended to address the issue of the
interception of the ongoing electronic communication process. See supra note 56
and accompanying text (arguing that Congress intended, by the addendum of
Title I, to deal with the interference with the computerized recordkeeping
system, such as computer database and remote data processing services).
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The Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games also suggested that
e-mail stored in a service provider computer was less subject to
invasion of privacy than a telephone wiretap.' 56 The court rea-
soned that, unlike the case of an interception of "electronic
communication" in transmission, law enforcement can avoid
accessing unrelated communications in the case of a stored
electronic communication by using "key word searches." '57
Thus, noted the court, the risk of access to unrelated communica-
tions by law enforcement is minimal in the case of a stored
electronic communication.' 58 However, the Fifth Circuit pointed
to the district court's finding that the Secret Service read all the
messages despite its contrary contention that it used "key word
searches.""' Hence, there is no assurance that a stored electron-
ic communication is not subject to the risk of general searches by
the government. '10
156 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463.
7 Id. "The key word search might include the names of suspected
participants, important dates, places of events surrounding the crime under
investigation, and other words likely to be found in the relevant communica-
tions." Bertron, supra note 64, at 189 n.175.
158 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463.
159 Id.
" "Although [listening to all calls] may be a necessary evil when tapping
a telephone because the contents otherwise will be lost forever, this rationale
does not apply to e-mail transmissions, and monitoring officers should never be
allowed to read all messages received on a suspect's e-mail account." Bertron,
supra note 64, at 188. Bertron, cited in Wesley College, also notes that:
Ideally, to meet the particularity requirement of Fourth Amend-
ment search warrants, officers should have probable cause to believe
that a particular e-mail communication contains evidence of crime.
When this level of particularity cannot be met, however, officers
applying for warrants to search electronic mail should be required to
describe a key word search that will be used to sift through the
suspect's e-mail. By using key word searches, the common abuse of
telephone wiretaps-i.e., listening to every conversation that passes
through the phone line-can be avoided.
Bertron, supra note 64, at 189 (footnote omitted). However, as the finding of
the district court in Steve Jackson Games indicates, there is no assurance that the
"key word search" is always enough, and thus, there remains the necessity for
regulating an interception of e-mail messages. Furthermore, it is easily
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In addition, there is no guarantee that the "key word search"
is an effective technology to prevent government access to
unrelated communications. Even if such technology becomes
available in the future, there remains the same level of the risk,
unless the use of such technology is mandated by the ECPA. 161
The very necessity of such a restriction shows that access to a
stored electronic communication requires stringent protection, as
in the case of an interception of an electronic communication in
transmission. It should be noted that the Supreme Court in Katz
stressed that privacy interests are best protected from governmental
invasions through an independent judicial process. 6 2 The Court
rejected the government's argument that self-restraint by the
government was sufficient. 163
C. An Eramination of Statutory Language in Wesley College
v. Pitts
In Wesley College v. Pitts,"6 the plaintiff college sued a
former computer maintenance employee and others for violation of
Titles I and II of the ECPA.16 The defendant allegedly had
conceivable that criminals may possibly disguise their messages to avoid the
chance of detection by using symbols or encryption technologies. The Senate
Report does not discuss the use of the "key word search." S. REP. No. 99-541,
at 31 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3585. The Senate Report
only notes, "the minimization [of wiretapping] should be conducted by the initial
law enforcement officials who review the transcript. Those officials would delete
all non-relevant materials and disseminate to other officials only that information
which is relevant to the investigation." Id.
161 A court order mandating the use of the "key word search" in accord
with the particularity requirement under the Fourth Amendment may also
suffice.
162 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
163 Id. at 356.
164 974 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1997).
165 Id. at 377. In the cases of governmenta, seizure, such as Steve Jackson
Games, access to the unread (unretrieved) e-mail messages was made incidental
to the execution of the search warrant for other items. Steve Jackson Games,
Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 459 (5th Cir. 1994). The e-mail
messages were stored in the e-mail service provider's computer, which was
covered by the search warrant (although the e-mail messages were not covered
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unauthorized access to e-mail messages stored in the college's
mainframe computer.1 66 The court held that such access did not
constitute an interception under Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act)
because the access was not contemporaneous with the transmission
of the e-mail messages.167
by the warrant). Id. The court in Steve Jackson Games applied Title II and
found the government liable, but denied the government liability under Title I.
Id. at 459-60. Thus, in Steve Jackson Games, the extent of the invasion of
privacy interest was somewhat confined as the court analogized its case to the
seizure and listening to the audio tapes not covered by a search warrant. Id. at
460. However, in Wesley College, there was no such unique situation. The
defendant employee, who was responsible for the maintenance of the plaintiff's
computer system, was sued for reading e-mail messages in the computer without
authorization. Wesley College, 974 F. Supp. at 377-80.
166 Wesley College, 974 F. Supp. at 377-80.
167 Id. The court stated that " [such] conclusion has been endorsed, either
implicitly or otherwise, by commentators." Id. at 388 n. 12. For example, the
court quoted Thomas R. Greenberg as stating:
[T]he stored communications provisions of [section] 2701 prohibit the
unauthorized accessing of wire or electronic communications once
stored. While the distinction between the terms "intercept" and
"access" has little significance for forms of communication that only
exist as transmissions, and are never stored, the distinction is critical
when a transmitted communication is later electronically stored,
because it is at the time of storage that a communication becomes
subject to different provisions of the ECPA. This is the case with both
E-mail and voice-mail messages, both of which have a transmission
phase and a storage phase. During the transmission phase, any
protection against unlawful interception under [the ECPA] is governed
by [section] 2511. On arrival in storage, the same messages are
subject to [section] 2701.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Greenberg, supra note 4, at 248). However,
Greenberg bases his conclusion on the assumption that the term "intercept" must
be narrowly construed to mean "interrupt the progress or course of," citing an
English dictionary. See Greenberg, supra note 4, at 248. See also supra note
133 and accompanying text (citing the dictionaries quoted by Greenberg).
However, Greenberg acknowledges that such a construction results in an
"irrational result" and "an insupportable result given Congress' emphasis of
individual privacy rights during passage of the ECPA." Greenberg, supra note
4, at 249. The court in Wesley College also cited Gregory L. Brown, who
describes Steve Jackson Games as "correct in its reasoning and holding." Wesley
College, 974 F. Supp. at 388. See also Brown, supra note 28, at 1390.
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The plaintiff argued that access to e-mail stored in a service
provider computer is an interception.168 The plaintiff asserted
that "electronic communication" and "wire communication" focus
on "the manner in which a communication is transmitted," not
"the meaning of a 'communication."" 69 In other words, "a
communication does not cease being a communication after it is
transmitted," and "[t]here is no temporal limitation on the
acquisition of a communication in the definition of intercept."170
Thus, the plaintiff argued that such language evinced that Congress
did not intend to limit "interception" to the access simultaneous
with transmission.' 7
Moreover, the plaintiff argued that Titles I and II were
overlapping and interconnected.' 72 Thus, the difference in re-
quirements and procedures between Titles I and II cannot justify
denying the application of Title I to a stored electronic communica-
tion.'73 The plaintiff reasoned that Title II is a lesser included
offense of Title I for a stored electronic communication; that is,
Title I requires acquisition of the contents of "electronic communi-
cation," while Title II prohibits mere access, without authorization,
to a stored electronic communication. 74 The court, however,
However, Brown does not give a reason why the court's reasoning and holding
are correct. See Brown, supra note 28, at 1389-91. Instead, Brown makes the
point that the court's reasoning and conclusion result in an undesirable
interpretation and warns that a constitutional claim under the Fourth Amendment
is likely to arise in the future. See Brown, supra note 28, at 1390-91.
"6 Wesley College, 974 F. Supp. at 386.
169 Id.
170 id.
171 Id.
'72 Id. at 388-89.
173 Id. at 388.
174 Id. at 388-89. The Fifth Circuit in Wesley College referred to the same
argument made by the government in United States v. Moriarty. Wesley College,
974 F. Supp. at 389 n.13 (citing Moriarity, 962 F. Supp. 217, 219 (D. Mass.
1997). The government in Moriarty gave an example as follows: "[A] person
could violate [Title II] by entering the Justice Department's computer system and
altering the codes that would allow access to e-mail by authorized users. This
would be a violation even though confidential e-mail messages were never
intercepted. Such contact would not violate [Title I]." Id. (second and third
alteration in original). The Moriarty court did not resolve this issue. Id. The
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rejected this argument because the plaintiff lacked support for its
reasoning. 175
Yet, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Smith, agreed with
the plaintiff's position. 176 The court stated that "[t]he word
'intercept' entails actually acquiring the contents of a communica-
tion, whereas the word 'access' merely involves being in position
to acquire the contents of a communication." 1 77 Thus, "'access'
is a lesser included offense ...of 'intercept[ion].' 178 The court
reasoned that "[b]oth textual and structural considerations support
our interpretation. "179 First, the court's interpretation "comports
with the statutory definition of 'intercept' as entailing actual
'acquisition,' . . . and with the ordinary meaning of 'access[]'
Fifth Circuit in Wesley College also left the issue open. Id. However, the Ninth
Circuit, in United States v. Smith, answered the question affirmatively. 155 F.3d
1051, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 804 (1999).
175 Wesley College, 974 F. Supp. at 389 (stating "[the plaintiff] has pointed
to no authority or legislative history to indicate Congress intended such a
result"). See also S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557 (stating that the focus of Title II is "the advent of
computerized recordkeeping system"). The Senate Report also notes that:
[T]he providers of electronic mail create electronic copies of private
correspondence for later reference. . . . [O]ften [the information] is
maintained for approximately 3 months to ensure system integrity. For
the person or business whose records are involved, the privacy or
proprietary interest in that information should not change. Neverthe-
less, because it is subject to control by a third party computer
operator, the information may be subject to no constitutional privacy
protection. Thus, the information may be open to possible wrongful
use and public disclosure by law enforcement authorities as well as
unauthorized private parties. The provider of these services can do
little under current law to resist unauthorized access to communica-
tions.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Title II seems to cover the special case
of recordkeeping in the control of a third party, supplementing the primary
protection under Title I. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing
the coverage of Title II).
176 155 F.3d 1051, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 804
(1999).
" Id. at 1058 (emphasis in original).
178 Id. (alteration and emphasis in original).
179 Id.
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(which is not statutorily defined) as meaning 'to get at' or to 'gain
access to."" 180 Second, "whereas the language of § 2701 refers
broadly to accessing a communication's 'facility,' § 2515 refers
more pointedly to intercepting the 'wire . . . communication'
itself."18 1 Third, the court explained that its interpretation was
consistent with the stiffer criminal and civil liabilities under Title
I.182 Fourth, the absence of a statutory exclusionary rule for Title
II conforms to the interpretation that Title II deals with only
access, and thus the mere possibility of acquiring the contents of
a communication. 183
The plaintiff in Wesley College also argued that Titles I and II
overlapped because the definition of "wire communication"
includes "electronic storage." '84 In fact, the court conceded that
there may be overlap between the two titles as to "wire communi-
cation," but countered that it does not necessarily show that a
similar overlap exists for "electronic communication."185 Howev-
er, the plaintiff's point, at a minimum, significantly weakens the
court's argument that the differences between requirements in
Titles I and II require denial of the application of Title I to the
"electronic communication" in storage, because the same argument
can be made for "wire communication." 8 6
Moreover, the plaintiff asserted that if Title I is not applicable
to a stored electronic communication, the disclosure of the contents
of an electronic communication by a private person, other than a
service provider, may not be punished under either Title I or Title
11.187 In other words, Title I prohibits disclosure of the contents
of an electronic communication, but does not specifically refer to
180 Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 49 (1986))
(alteration in original).
"I Id. at 1059.
182 id.
183 Id.
"8 974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (D. Del. 1997).
185 Id.
186 Despite the differences between the requirements in Titles I and II, both
titles apply to "wire communication" while in "electronic storage." 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2511, 2701 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
187 Wesley College, 974 F. Supp. at 388.
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such disclosure of a stored electronic communication."' 8 Further,
Title II prohibits the disclosure of a stored electronic communica-
tion made only by a service provider." 9 Thus, unless Title I
encompasses a stored electronic communication, a person, other
than a service provider, who discloses the contents of a stored
electronic communication may not be punishable under the ECPA.
The court, while acknowledging the gap to be troubling, simply
stated that it was a matter to be addressed by Congress. 1" How-
ever, a settled canon of statutory interpretation is that the literary
interpretation must be avoided when it results in an absurd
result.19 ' Here, the court bluntly ignores the absurd result with-
out justification.
Furthermore, the contemporaneity requirement of the intercep-
tion has led other courts, which followed the requirement mechani-
cally, to the undesirable conclusion."9 For example, in United
States v. Moriarty, the court held that listening to a stored voice
mail message was not an interception because the defendant did not
listen to the voice mail while it was recorded on the answering
machine. 93 Similarly, in United States v. Reyes, the court held
that pressing the pager button to gain access to its message was not
an interception because such access was not made while the
message was being transmitted to the pager. 94 Further, in Payne
v. Norwest Corp., the non-simultaneous recording of a voice mail
message with a handheld tape recorder was held not to be an
188 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1994).
19 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994).
190 Wesley College, 974 F. Supp. at 389.
191 See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)
(quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982));
Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 78 F.3d 1523, 1529 (11 th Cir. 1996).
'92 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing that a consequence
of the Steve Jackson Games decision is the tendency of the police to circumvent
Title I by accessing stored communications).
"9 962 F. Supp. 217, 220-21 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing Steve Jackson Games'
contemporaneity requirement).
'9' 922 F. Supp. 818, 836-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Steve Jackson Games'
contemporaneity requirement).
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interception.'95 Finally, in Bohach v. City of Reno, the access to
the messages stored in the computerized paging system was held
not an interception, because such an access was not contemporane-
ous with the transmission. 196
III. AN ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION MORE
CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE ECPA
The courts in Steve Jackson Games and Wesley College failed
to examine in detail the meaning of the critical term "electronic
storage," and therefore misunderstood the relationship between
"electronic storage" and "electronic communication." "Electronic
storage" is a part of the entire communication process, and thus,
the definition of "electronic communication" impliedly covers
"electronic storage," whether or not that definition includes the
specific reference to "electronic storage. ""9 The inclusion of the
reference to "electronic storage" in the definition of "wire
communication" does not mean that the word "communication"
excludes "storage." The reason why "wire communication"
requires the reference to "electronic storage" is that although
"wire communication" might cover its wire storage as part of the
entire communication process, it is not clear whether "wire
communication" includes storage of an electronic nature, without
the reference to "electronic storage." 98 Accordingly, the absence
of the explicit reference to "electronic storage" in "electronic
communication" does not support the interpretation of the Fifth
Circuit in Steve Jackson Games that "electronic communication"
'95 911 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Mont. 1995) (citing Steve Jackson Games'
contemporaneity requirement), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 113 F.3d 1079
(9th Cir. 1997).
" 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1235-36 (D. Nev. 1996) (following the Steve
Jackson Games court's reasoning).
'" See discussion infra Part III.A, arguing that "electronic communication"
impliedly covers "electronic storage".
'98 See infra Part III.B, discussing the function of the reference to
"electronic storage" in the definition of "wire communication" in the overall
statutory structure.
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does not include "electronic storage." 199 To the contrary, "elec-
tronic communication" impliedly includes "electronic storage,"
and thus, Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act) applies to e-mail stored
in a service provider computer.20°
A. The Term "Electronic Communication" Impliedly Covers
"Electronic Storage"
The meaning of "electronic storage" is important because the
Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games considered the absence of
that term in the definition of "electronic communication" as
determinative of the nonapplicability of Title I (the Federal
Wiretap Act) to an interception of e-mail stored in a service
provider computer.2 °" The term "electronic storage" is defined
in the ECPA basically as "a temporary, intermediate storage of a
199 See infra Part III.A, arguing that "electronic communication" impliedly
covers "electronic storage".
20 See infra Part III.B (discussing the function of the reference to
"electronic storage" in the definition of "wire communication" in overall
statutory structure). In the ECPA, the term "intercept" is defined as "the aural
or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communica-
tion through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(4) (1994). Since the acquisition of the contents of e-mail messages does
not necessarily require simultaneous access with the transmission of e-mail, the
definition of "intercept" is broad enough to include access to e-mail stored in a
service provider computer. See id. Such a broadly written definition of
"electronic communication" should be given liberal construction to be consistent
with Congressional intent. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (arguing
that Congress intended liberal construction of the term "electronic communica-
tion"). When Congress intended to exclude certain electronic communications,
Congress added explicit clauses for the exceptions at the end of the broad
definition of "electronic communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994 & Supp.
III 1997) (defining "electronic communication," following the substantive
descriptive words, as "not includ[ing]-(A) any wire or oral communication; (B)
any communication made through a tone-only paging device; (C) any communi-
cation from a tracking device ... ; or (D) electronic funds transfer information
stored by a financial institution in a communication system used for the
electronic storage and transfer of funds").
201 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457,
461 (5th Cir. 1994).
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wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof." 202
By its definition, "electronic storage" is a part of the communi-
cation process, because "electronic storage" is the temporary and
intermediate storage of communication, either wire or electron-
ic. °3 For example, a message recorded on a telephone answering
machine is still in the process of communication. Furthermore, the
definition of "electronic communication" excludes a certain kind
of stored information, 2' and thus, such exclusion assumes that
"electronic communication" generally includes its storage.2 °5
202 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (1994). See supra note 142 and accompanying text
(delineating section 2510(17)). The term "electronic storage" is used in the
definition of "wire communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994). See supra
note 141 and accompanying text (delineating section 2510(1)). Furthermore,
Title II covers "electronic storage" of both "wire communication" and
"electronic communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See
supra note 12 and accompanying text (delineating section 2701).
23 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17). Moreover, "electronic storage" is defined to be
incidental to electronic transmission, and thus, is by concept closely related to
the transmission process. See id. In other words, "electronic storage"
accompanies the transmission, and therefore is not a totally separate and
independent process. Hence, "electronic storage" is a part of the entire
communication process. See infra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing
that such a construction conforms to the overall statutory structure). Commenta-
tor Nicole Giallonardo, however, argues that stored e-mail is in transit and does
not complete its final transmission until the intended recipient retrieves the e-
mail from a service provider computer. Giallonardo, supra note 28, at 186.
Giallonardo concludes that e-mail is acquired contemporaneously with its
transmission process, amounting to an interception under Title I, as construed
in Turk. Giallonardo, supra note 28, at 186. However, Turk's contemporaneity
requirement was designed to exclude this very stored communication, and
therefore her argument fails.
2 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(D) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). "Electronic
communication" does not include "electronic funds transfer information stored."
Id. (emphasis added). See supra note 142 and accompanying text (delineating
section 2510(12)).
' Moreover, section 2510(12)(D) was added in 1996, after the Steve
Jackson Games decision. Thus, it is more likely that Congress assumed that
"electronic communication" generally includes storage of the communication,
notwithstanding the Steve Jackson Games decision.
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Moreover, "electronic communication system"' is defined as
the facilities for "electronic transmission" and "electronic
storage," and thus, implies that communication includes both the
"transmission" and "storage" stages. Similarly, "electronic
communication" is defined as "transfer," not "transmission, "2°
and thus, such difference indicates that "electronic communica-
tion" includes more than mere transmission. In fact, the word
"transfer" is used in the ECPA as the entire process of communi-
cation from its origin to its receipt by an addressee. 28
206 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14) (1994) provides as follows: "'electroniccommuni-
cation system' means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or
photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of electronic communications, and
any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage
of such communications."
2w 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See supra note 142 and
accompanying text (delineating section 2510(12)).
1 The term "aural transfer" is defined as "a transfer containing the human
voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of
reception." 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (18) (1994). "Aural" points to "containing the
human voice," and "transfer" points to "at any point between and including the
point of origin and the point of reception." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore,
transfer covers the entire process of communication from its origin to its receipt
by an addressee, including its temporary and intermediate storage, if any.
Transfer is broader in meaning than transmission, and includes an incidental
process of transmission, i.e., the temporary and intermediate storage. See S.
REP. No. 99-541, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566
(explaining that "the term 'wire communication' means the transfer of a
communication ... through the use of communication transmission facilities").
The title of "Electronic Communications Privacy Act" indicates that communica-
tion covers the entire communication process, including its storage, because the
statute consists of Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act) and Title II (the Stored
Communications Act). Furthermore, among oral, wire and electronic communi-
cations, the meaning of communication, and transfer, should be seen as the
same. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (describing
"electronic communication" as "transfer," as in the case of "wire communica-
tion" under section 2510(1)). If different meanings are to be given to communi-
cation in "oral communication," "wire communication," and "electronic
communication," such would be spelled out. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (2), (12).
However, these definitions focus on the means of communication, because the
word "communication" itself is not defined. See id. In addition, the interpreta-
tion that the meaning of communication is basically the same in oral, wire and
electronic communications is supported by the phrase in section 2510(12)(A),
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Accordingly, "electronic communication" includes "electronic
storage," regardless of whether it is specifically mentioned in the
definition of "electronic communication." The Fifth Circuit in
Steve Jackson Games, however, considered the absence of the
reference to "electronic storage" dispositive. 2  The court as-
sumed, without explanation, that the definition of "electronic
communication" does not include "electronic storage."210 How-
ever, such an assumption is misplaced because "electronic
communication" includes its "electronic storage" as part of the
entire communication process.211 Since the definition of "elec-
tronic communication" itself already covers "electronic storage,"
it is not necessary to specifically add that phrase. Therefore, since
"electronic communication" includes "electronic storage," the
absence of the reference to it in "electronic communication" does
not support the court's conclusion that "electronic communication"
does not include "electronic storage."
B. The Function of the Reference to "Electronic Storage"
in the Definition of "Wire Communication" in the
Overall Statutory Structure
"Communication" encompasses the entire process of communi-
cation, including its transmission and storage.212 In addition, the
which specifically excludes oral and wire communications from an electronic
communication to clarify the relationship between these three communications.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(A). See supra note 142 and accompanying text
(delineating section 2510(12)). Thus, transfer, and in turn, communication
includes the whole process of the communication until received and covers its
temporary and intermediate storage. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (2), (12).
o Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457,
461 (5th Cir. 1994).
210 Id. at 461-62.
211 See supra note 208 and accompanying text (arguing that such a
construction conforms to the overall statutory structure).
212 See discussion supra Part II.A, arguing that "electronic communication"
impliedly covers "electronic storage". Moreover, Title II provides in part
"whoever . . . obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall
be punished." 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (emphasis added).
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definition of "wire communication" specifically states that it
encompasses the entire process "between the point of origin and
the point of reception."213 Thus, "wire communication" clearly
includes its intermediate storage, even without referring to it.
Therefore, the assumption of the Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson
Games that the reference to storage in "wire communication" is
made in order to include its storage is misplaced.214
The phrase "and such term includes any electronic storage of
such communication" 215 in the definition of "wire communica-
tion" is necessary in order to include storage of an electronic
nature, which is broader than wire storage. Without the specific
reference to "electronic storage," it is not clear whether "wire
communication" includes storage of an electronic nature. "Wire
communication" historically meant a telephone and a tele-
graph.216 Thus, although the word "wire communication" in-
cludes its incidental storage process, such storage will normally be
understood as wire storage, not "electronic storage."217 There-
fore, the phrase "and such term includes any electronic storage of
such communication" removes the ambiguity about the relationship
between "wire communication" and "electronic storage." Such a
Thus, the phrase "a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic
storage" implies that both communications include their storage phases. See
supra note 208 and accompanying text (arguing that such a construction
conforms to the overall statutory structure).
213 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). "Wire communication" is defined as "any aural
transfer made. .. between the point of origin and the point of reception." Id.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text (delineating section 2510(1)).
214 In Steve Jackson Games, that assumption was the basis of the court's
conclusion that the absence of the reference to the storage in "electronic
communication" shows that it does not include the storage. See 36 F.3d at 461.
215 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1). See supra note 141 and accompanying text
(delineating section 2510(1)).
216 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (citing Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 45-49 (1967)).
217 The term "electronic communication" is important because Title II (the
Stored Communications Act) primarily deals with "electronic storage" of wire
and electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701.
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phrase expressly shows that "wire communication" covers its
"electronic storage."' 8
Accordingly, a close examination of the language and structure
of the ECPA requires the opposite result of that reached by the
Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games. The court failed to examine
the meaning of the term "electronic storage," and thus, misunder-
stood the relationship between "electronic storage" and "electronic
communication." The term "electronic communication" impliedly
covers "electronic storage" as part of its entire communication
process.219 The court's reliance on the absence of the reference
to "electronic storage" in "electronic communication" is mis-
placed. Since "electronic communication" includes its "electronic
storage," e-mail stored in a service provider computer is subject
to an interception under Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act). This
interpretation conforms to the overall structure of the ECPA,' 2
and also eliminates the undesirable result created by the interpreta-
tion of the Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games.2 '
218 Moreover, since "electronic communication" is defined as exclusive of
"wire communication," 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994), and "electronic communi-
cation" includes "electronic storage," if "wire communication" does not include
"electronic storage" other than wire storage, such "electronic storage" might be
construed as part of "electronic communication," which is less protected under
certain circumstances under Title I. See supra Part II.B, describing the less
protection under Title I for an electronic communication. Without the specific
addendum of its "electronic storage" to the definition of "wire communication,"
"wire communication" will not include its "electronic storage," because it may
be a part of the larger concept of "electronic communication." See supra note
141 and accompanying text (delineating section 2510(12)).
219 See discussion supra Part III.A, arguing that "electronic communication"
impliedly covers "electronic storage".
2 Moreover, the legislative history generally supports this interpretation in
that electronic communication is not distinguished from wire or oral communica-
tions for the needs of privacy protection and Title II is not intended to cover an
interception of e-mail temporarily stored in a service provider computer. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text (referring to the Senate Report for this
Congressional intent).
"2 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (arguing that police tend to
circumvent Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act) by accessing e-mail stored in a
service provider computer).
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CONCLUSION
Seventy years ago, Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion
in Olmstead v. United States, predicted that modern technological
development would someday enable law enforcement to search
people or their properties without physically trespassing a person's
property.'z Today, advancements in telecommunications technol-
ogy have dramatically changed our life. In particular, Internet
technology has increased in popularity and will significantly
change the way we handle our affairs.223
Justice Brandeis also stated that courts should be alert to the
changes of time and the emergence of new conditions and purposes
in determining the issue of statutory interpretation.' 2 However,
the current interpretation of the ECPA by the courts following
Steve Jackson Games directly contradicts the Congressional intent
that e-mail enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy and be
subject to Title I (the Federal Wiretap Act). Such an interpretation
has created the undesirable consequence that police can circumvent
Title I by accessing e-mail stored in a service provider computer.
As in the case of a telephone wiretapping, an interception of e-
mail, whether stored or not, leads to a serious invasion of privacy
by government without the safeguards of Title I. Moreover, the
courts' interpretation contradicts the language and structure of the
ECPA. Contrary to a line of cases following Steve Jackson Games,
Title I applies to the access to e-mail stored in a service provider
computer because the statutory language and structure of the
ECPA, consistent with the Congressional intent, supports such a
fair interpretation.
Given the alternative fair interpretation of Titles I and II of the
ECPA proposed by this Note, courts should re-examine the privacy
protection of e-mail under the ECPA in light of the Katz decision
that led to the doctrine of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Uneven protection of "electronic communication" and "wire
222 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
223 See Dempsey, supra note 8, at 67-69.
22' See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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communication" as a result of Steve Jackson Games underestimates
the reasonable privacy expectation of people who use e-mail
routinely and discourages their reliance on e-mail as a contempo-
rary method of communication.

